NEWS FROM
BRAZIL
supplied by Brazil Justice Net
Number 617, September 8, 2009
In this week's News from
Brazil:
U.S.
Military Bases in Colombia Cause Concern for Neighboring Countries
by Dafne Melo and Luis Brasilino
The
second half of this year has begun with difficulties [here in Latin
America]. Shortly after the military coup in Honduras,
Colombian
president Alvaro Uribe announced that the United States would be
installing seven military bases in that country. However,
while in the
first country a possible meddling of the United States is a source of
dissatisfaction in and outside of Honduras, the announcement of the
second country has received the support of some, and silence from
others. The only outright opposition has come from
Evo Morales
(Bolivia), Rafael Correa (Ecuador) and Hugo Chavez
(Venezuela).
Peruvian president Alan Garcia has given his support to Uribe, while
other leaders--Fernando Lugo (Paraguay), Tabare Vazquez
(Uruguay),
Cristina Kirchner (Argentina), and Luiz Inacio da Silva have maintained
diplomatic relations but have insisted on dialogue.
The
agreement between the U.S. and Colombia raises cause for concern,
affirmed political scientist Luiz Alberto Moniz Bandeira, retired
professor from the University of Brasilia. In all, the United
States
will use seven bases, four already in existence and will build three
more. Even though the U.S. has affirmed that the bases will
be used
for military operations aimed at combating drug trafficking and to
refuel cargo planes, it is clear that the real objective is to maintain
vigilance in the area. Even official U.S. documents confirm
this,
arguing for autonomy of flights departing from Colombia and an increase
of budget for “non-specified” military operations.
Below are excerpts from an interview with Moniz Bandeira:
Do the installation of
the bases signify the beginning of a great military build-up in the
region?
The
presence of military bases of the United States in South America is
nothing new. There were already bases in Boliva, and the
Joint
Peruvian Riverine Training Center--the epicenter of the war against the
Sendero Luminoso--still functions. In May of 2008, 70
soldiers of the
Task Force New Horizons arrived [in Peru] under the pretext of engaging
in humanitarian operations. This number increased to 350
between June
and July of that year. In October, pilots and crew of the
U.S. Army’s
CH-47D “Chinook” and heavily armed
soldiers from Task Force New
Horizon gave support to 990 U.S. soldiers operating in this region, 575
kilometers southeast of Lima, where the U.S. was negotiating with the
Peruvian Armed Forces for a military base. This in the
context of
firming up the Freed Trade Agreement enacted in December of
2007. The
interest of the U.S. in installing a base in Ayacucho, which is
equidistant from the areas dominated by Farc in Colombia and the social
conflicts in Bolivia, is to facilitate the mobilization of its
contingents in all regions of South America. The U.S.
continues to use
a naval base in Iquitos, north of Peru, in a strategic region of the
Amazon, and has at its disposal marine equipment, such as combat
launches. There are other bases in Santa Lucia and one over
the Nanai
River. In Ecuador, there is the Manta Air Force Base [in
Ecuador],
which will be closed and moved to Palanquero, in Puerto Salar, 120
miles to the north of Bogotá.
So what is so new about
this latest investment in Colombia?
What
is new and cause for alarm is the extent to which operations will be
amplified. This air force base in Puerto Salgar will be
capable of
receiving more than two thousand soldiers, it will posses radar
equipment, and will have its own casinos, restaurants, supermarkets,
theaters and hospital. The airport runway will be the longest
in
Colombia at 3,500 meters, more that 600 meters than that of
Manta.
Three airplanes will be able to take off simultaneously. Thus
they
will have point of support in the center of Colombia--even
better than
that of Manta--with the installation of three military bases in Malambo
(Caribbean coast), Palanquero (close to Bogota), and Apiay, near the
Brazilian border.
With the
installation of these bases, is there any legitimacy to the argument
that Colombia may become the “Israel” of Latin
America?
You
cannot compare Colombia to Israel. The economic conditions,
the
politics and the cultures are quite different. But, in fact,
the U.S.
military support to Colombia, since 2004, will by this year mount up to
US$3.3 billion. Or better, since the beginning of the
Colombian Plan
in 2000, the Colombian army has received US$4.35 billion,
making it
the best equipped army of South America, relatively speaking.
With a
population of 44 million, Colombia has military contingent of
208,600.
Brazil, with a population 190 million and 8.5 million square kilometers
has only 287,870 in its military; Argentina, with 40 million
inhabitants and 2.7 million square kilometers, has only
71,655.
Colombia, with a Gross Domestic Product at US$320.4 billion, designates
3.8% of its budget to military spending. Brazil, with a US$2
trillion
GDP only spends 1.5%. Argentina, with a US$523,7 billion GDP,
spends
only 1.1%.
In 2005, Congress granted to the region US$9.2
million in economic aid, and another US$859.6 for military
assistance.
In fighting the guerillas, soldiers and police have committed an
increasing number of murders and abuses of human rights, and over a
period of five years, up to June of 2006, extrajudicial executions
increased more than 50% in relation to the previous period.
How
would you evaluate the positioning of the Latin-American presidents in
relation to the bases? How do you see Uribe’s
efforts to dialogue with
some of these heads of states?
As far as I know, with the
exception of Alan Garcia, they are all opposed, but they see it as a
sovereignty issue of Colombia. What else can they
do? They cannot
intervene in Colombia. But there is isolation, and it was
Uribe’s
intention to avoid greater isolation when he visited some countries in
South America, including Brazil.
The
U.S. budget proposal for spending in Colombia calls for a 13% decrease
in spending destined for combating drug trafficking, while spending for
“non-specific” military operations is 30% more
compared to the previous
budget. What do these numbers demonstrate?
The
justification in the agreements for military bases in Latin America and
the Caribbean is the combat of drug trafficking. But there is
an
explicit understanding that in the use of these bases “it is
not
prohibited other types of organization of the Department of
Defense.”
It is clear that the United States uses these Forward Operation
Locations, installed also in El Salvador and in Aruba/Curacao, for
other types of operations. They have an objective
strategy. The
permanent stationing of troops and military equipment in Colombia and
in Peru, as well as in Suriname and Guiana, and previously in Ecuador
and Bolivia, gives the U.S. an enormous strategic advantage to
intervene militarily in whatever country, and if necessary, to defend
its economic interests and occupy the regions of the Amazon River.
In
reality, the militarization of Colombia, with the presence of more than
1,000 soldiers and U.S. mercenaries who are employed by Pentagon
business firms, in the region and neighboring regions, constitutes a
threat to Brazil’s own national security, in the measure that
it
threatens the Amazon.
Do you see a connection
between the bases in Colombia and the coup in Honduras?
Although
they happened at roughly the same time, and in some sense are related,
there is no direct connection between the coup in Honduras and the
installation of the bases in Colombia. The transfer of the
military
installations in Manta to Colombia was already planned since Rafael
Correa became president of Ecuador and had already announced in January
of 2007 that he was not going to renew the contract for the Manta base.
As
I have said, what is different about the bases of Colombia is the size,
besides the objective of combating drug trafficking being
suspect.
This was certainly planned with the restoration of the Fourth Fleet of
the South Atlantic, amplifying U.S. presence in the region and thus
assuring control of the region’s natural resources, such as
water and
petroleum. The objective is to restrict the political and
military
power of Brazil, frustrating initiatives like Unasul and South American
Council of Defense. These are not under U.S.
domination.
With
the installation and amplification of military bases on the margins of
the Amazon and the Fourth Fleet navigating the South Atlantic on the
margins of the enormous oil reserves discovered by Petrobras, Brazil is
surrounded. South America is surrounded, and marked
militarily as an
economic and geopolitical space of the United States.
Source: Brasil De Fato, August 13-19, 2009
Update
on RESEX in Sirinhaem, Pernambuco
Brazil Justice Net
received this information from Fr. James Thorlby of the
Church’s Land Commission Office:
On
August 21, the much-awaited process to protect the public lands in
Sirinhaem took a step forward. A hearing was held to publicly
discuss
the need for and the consequences of making an Extravist Reserve
(RESEX) out of the lands on which many people live and fish.
The
Trapiche Sugar Mill spoke against the measure because they have
illegally been planting sugarcane on these lands and dumping pollution
into the waters for years. Despite the efforts of Trapiche
and the
people they had brought to the public hearing, 400 people who make
their lives on the islands and their allies supported the RESEX.
The
next step in the process will be to determine whether the state
government of Pernambuco or the federal government will oversee the
implementation of the RESEX. We will continue to watch this
story as
it unfolds and keep you informed.
Brazil Justice Net had sent
out an urgent action alert asking readers to send emails in support of
the RESEX process to the President and the Director of the Chico Mendes
Institute. Many people in North America and Europe reported
that their
emails were returned to them as undeliverable. Staff at the
Commissao
Pastoral da Terra, which has been accompanying the people of Sirinhaem,
believe that those emails actually were received and did make
a
difference. Furthermore they believe that the government
agency made
changes to their email program in an attempt to discourage the
supporters of the RESEX. Your emails were important in
forcing the
government to hold this hearing. Thank you for your support.
The
reproduction of this
material is permitted as long as the source is cited. If you wish to
contact us, send a message to bjn@braziljusticenet.org.
